14. By War’s End, the Soviets Had Closed the Gap in Professionalism vis a vis the Germans
Stalin, especially early in the war, frequently overrode his military professionals’ advice and ordered ill-advised last stands or foolhardy attacks. Even without Stalin, Soviet commanders were more ruthless and less concerned about casualties than their Western counterparts. However, it was not a reflection of callousness, but a mark of their desperation early in the war, when they had to buy time at any cost.
Later in the war, when on the offensive, it reflected a rational calculation. The reasoning was that even a high price paid up front in an attack, so long as it resulted in an exploitable breakthrough, would translate into overall lower casualties. In the medium term, losses during rapid advances following a breakthrough were lower than the norm, while those of the reeling Germans were higher. As to the long term, the Soviets justified high losses in a successful breakthrough because they would bring the war to a speedier end, and thus bring the bloodshed to an earlier end.
