18. The United States implemented an Alsos mission for Japan in 1945
During the war, American intelligence agencies and the scientific community harbored little concern of the Japanese developing an atomic bomb. Japan simply lacked access to uranium needed for both research and the eventual construction of such a weapon. However, the Americans grew concerned over the Japanese use of another weapon of mass destruction, biological weapons. Alsos revealed the extent of biological weapons research by the Germans, which included documentation exchanged with the Japanese. By 1945 the Germans had an extensive inventory of biological weapons, though Hitler refused to authorize their use. The Fuhrer had himself been gassed on the Western Front during the First World War. Historians have since speculated that may have led to his refusal to deploy gas and biological weapons during the Second World War. At any rate, they had them, but did not use them against Allied troops.
The Alsos mission for Japan operated independently of those for Europe, and was originally envisioned as being part of the invasion forces planned for Japan. Deployed to Manila in the summer of 1945, the mission, entirely American in make-up, prepared to examine the Japanese biological, chemical, and nuclear programs in a manner similar to the Alsos teams in Europe. Armed support groups similar to Europe’s T-Force trained to operate with the Alsos teams. After the Japanese surrendered in September, 1945, the teams deployed to Japan and China to examine the records and interrogate the personnel of the Japanese weapons of mass destruction programs. General Groves concerned himself only with the Japanese nuclear research programs. He learned, through Alsos missions, the Japanese had assigned low priority to an atomic weapon. Lacking uranium there was little else they could do.
19. The German atomic weapon program proved much smaller than expected
When the senior scientists for the Alsos missions reviewed the scale of the German research into atomic weapons they expressed dismissal. Samuel Goudsmit, the senior scientist for the Alsos mission, personally inspected some of the German research sites, including those unearthed in Haigerloch. He wrote to General Groves of the site, describing it as “â¦compared to what we were doing in the United Statesâ¦small-time stuff”. Later Goudsmit speculated over the usefulness of the Alsos missions, which placed numerous scientists, engineers, and support troops at considerable personal risk. “Sometimes we wondered”, he wrote, “if our government had not spent more money on our intelligence than the Germans had spent on their whole project”. The Alsos missions knew, as did Generals Groves, Marshall, and Eisenhower, the Germans were years away from an atomic bomb by 1944. However, that fact remained classified for years after the war.
Despite the heavy security surrounding the American atomic bomb, Soviet espionage agents and spy rings penetrated both the Manhattan Project and the German efforts during the war. Although the Alsos missions deprived the Soviets of several of the most notable German scientists involved, and much of their records, the Soviets acquired many others. Many of the records obtained in Alsos raids had already been copied and sent to the Soviet Union by its many agents in Germany during the war. The Soviet atomic bomb program did not really gain momentum until 1942, when the Manhattan Project’s programs were well underway. In 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated an atomic bomb, aided in a large part by the materials stolen from the Manhattan Project in the United States and the German efforts during World War II.
20. The Alsos missions did little to alter the course of the Second World War
If the Alsos missions revealed anything, it was the fact the Germans were years away from developing a working atomic bomb. Werner Karl Heisenberg later stated that he and many of his colleagues deliberately impeded the effort to build such a weapon out of moral considerations. Heisenberg’s recorded conversations at Farm Hall did not reveal such reticence. Instead, they blamed Germany’s failure to produce a weapon to the low priority granted the program. Though some have claimed the German atomic weapons program became Hitler’s highest priority, in fact it received little attention following 1940, since it evidently could not produce a weapon for many years to come. It received limited resources and financial support. It lacked a unified command structure. Political and personal rivalries dominated among its contributors. Alsos revealed these failings. For years those findings remained classified.
General Groves, who led the Manhattan Project for the United States, argued the Germans failed to build an atomic bomb because they never developed the industrial base needed to produce one. Lack of raw materials also contributed to the failure, as more and more dwindling supplies went to the conventional warfare needs. America’s Manhattan Project consumed about $2 billion to produce the bombs which fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, about $29 billion today. Germany’s atomic weapons program consumed roughly $2 million measured in 1945 dollars, less than the cost of a single U-boat. The Alsos missions did little to alter the course of the war because the Germans were never close to possessing the bomb. Alsos missions proved it beyond doubt.
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