18. Parts of the Lusitania’s manifest were kept secret for decades
A copy of the manifest for Lusitania’s final voyage – the list of everything carried aboard as cargo – is held at the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, at Hyde Park in New York. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the time of the investigation into the sinking held in the United States. According to the manifest, 148 tubs of butter were being carried in the hold near the point where the torpedo struck, and where the second explosion occurred. The butter wasn’t provided by Borden, or by any other American dairy. It was provided by Remington Arms, which also shipped the small arms ammunition at the same time.
Remington shipped the “butter” (unrefrigerated) on behalf of its parent, E. I. duPont de Nemours, which was not in the business of making and shipping butter. But they did manufacture guncotton, which when exposed to seawater becomes extremely volatile. Guncotton still present in the wreck explains why in 1982 the British government warned salvage divers the ship could “literally blow up on us”.
19. The United States supported Great Britain while remaining officially neutral in 1915
The United States declared itself neutral in 1914, and remained so until it entered the war in 1917. Neutrality meant, under international law, the United States could continue to trade with all the belligerent nations. It was a violation of the rules of war to carry munitions on a neutral ship. Great Britain established a naval blockade of German ports which restricted trade. It was in response to the British blockade that the Germans declared a war zone in the waters surrounding Great Britain in 1915. The war zone applied to ships of neutral countries. Lusitania, though steaming unflagged, was easily recognizable as a British liner, it was one of the most famous and recognizable ships in the world.
The Germans, through their intelligence network in the United States and Great Britain, knew that Lusitania was carrying munitions, and that it had done so on previous voyages during the war. At the time of Lusitania’s sinking, no British ship had yet been hit by a torpedo when steaming at a speed exceeding 15 knots. Lusitania’s ability to exceed that speed throughout a voyage made the ship ideal for carrying cargo critical to Britain’s war effort. British purchasing of war material from the United States was perfectly legal, as was shipping it in the hull of a ship which was registered to the Royal Navy. It was a British decision not to inform the passengers of the nature of the cargo.
20. The Admiralty did little to protect Lusitania as it approached the Irish Sea
The presence of German submarine U-20, as well as other U-Boats, were known to the British Admiralty as Lusitania drew near the British Isles. U-20 had attacked several ships, some successfully, in the general area where Lusitania was to traverse. Yet the Admiralty did nothing to protect the liner as it approached. The ship could have been ordered to alter course to the north, going around the top of Ireland on its way to Liverpool. No such orders were given. Several destroyers were available in the channel ports, which could have been dispatched to escort the liner through the danger zone. No escort was offered. The ship was left to its own devices in waters where known submarine activity had recently occurred.
The First Lord of the Admiralty, the man who ran the Royal Navy at the time, was Winston Churchill. It was Churchill who pushed to place the blame for the loss of the ship on Captain Turner at the subsequent investigations, supported by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher. Both Churchill and Fisher were informed of the submarine activity; they ordered an increase in escorts for the battleship Orion, but none for Lusitania. The inaction by the leaders of the British navy led to speculation among historians that Churchill’s actions were deliberate, leading to the major disaster which he had previously remarked would be necessary for America to enter the war.
21. The troop movement rumors may have contributed to the sinking
In late April, 1917, as Lusitania took on its cargo in New York and prepared for its final crossing, German intelligence in Berlin began receiving information regarding movement of troops from Canada and Ireland to Great Britain. The troops were to be assembled, equipped, and transferred to the Western Front in Flanders and France. U-Boats were dispatched by the Imperial Navy, U-20 being one of them. The submarines were to watch the Irish ports, Liverpool, and the approaches from the west, specifically for troopships. Lusitania had not been used for transporting troops, but other liners had, and would again later in the war.
The rumors were just that, and whether they were part of a deliberate disinformation campaign has never been proven. The U-Boats were dispatched. U-20 actually attacked, or rather attempted to attack, another liner, White Star’s Arabic, before the attack on Lusitania (Arabic was sunk by U-24 in August, 1915, causing another diplomatic incident). What is known is that after U-20 sailed, it received transmissions which changed its orders.
22. U-20 was ordered to reposition after it left port
U-20, under Walther Schwieger, departed on patrol with specific orders to proceed up the North Sea, around Scotland, and down to the Mersey bar, a sandbank which restricted access to the estuary and the Port of Liverpool. When ships arrived at Liverpool they had to wait until high tide to enter the port, and many Captains altered their speed accordingly as they entered the approaches, to ensure they arrived at a time they could enter the Mersey without having to wait. SM U-20 was to sit outside the bar, where as ships slowed to begin their journey up the river he would have easy pickings with his torpedoes.
After he was underway, he received orders directing him to the south across the Irish Sea to the southern approaches of the British Channel. The radio messages sent to U-20 were intercepted and decoded by the Admiralty, in an area which Churchill had dubbed Room 40. The British were aware of the original mission of the submarine and the German decision to reposition to an area which would be traversed by the liners, including Arabic and Lusitania, but the warnings sent to the ships were limited to vague reports of submarine activity. Why more specific warnings were not sent, nor escorts provided, remains a mystery.
23. The Bryce Report followed the Lusitania disaster by a few days
The Committee on Alleged German Outrages issued its report, generally known as the Bryce Report, on May 12, 1915, less than a week after the Lusitania sinking. It displaced the latter from the front pages of newspapers in the United States. The Bryce report was allegedly based on depositions which were first-hand accounts from witnesses to German atrocities in Belgium and France. One finding was, “That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organized massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.” It accused the Germans of using civilians as human shields, systematic looting and pillaging, and the officers of the German Army of being complicit.
By the end of May, every newspaper in New York had reprinted the report. The British Propaganda Bureau shipped over 40,000 copies to the United States for distribution. Following the war, the depositions upon which the report had been based could not be found. The authors of the report, the committee, had based it (allegedly) entirely on the depositions, it had not actually questioned any of the supposed witnesses. In 1942 the depositions were located, but before they could be examined independently, they were destroyed, allegedly by a German rocket. The Bryce Report is now broadly dismissed as a piece of wartime propaganda, without basis of fact.
24. The Germans returned to unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917
Britain’s naval blockade continued after the sinking of Lusitania, and among the items, it listed as contraband were foodstuffs. International law did not support the British view, but neutral nations – including the United States – were prevented from shipping food to Germany and its allies. Protests over the British position were drowned out in the United States by those desirous of war with Germany and the British propaganda, which grew in intensity following the loss of Lusitania and the Bryce Report. The voices calling for peace negotiations in Europe, and denouncing British violations of international law, were not heard over the cries for war.
When the Germans returned to the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, the event combined with the Zimmerman telegram caused America to enter the war on the side of the Allies. American destroyers joined with the Royal Navy to suppress the U-Boat campaign for the rest of the war. By then most of the public had all but forgotten Lusitania and Arabic, and their sinking by the Germans. It was necessary to remind them, as Americans went to war to end all wars, of the inhumanity of the enemy they would encounter over there. American propaganda throughout the war followed the example of the British.
Where do we find this stuff? Here are our sources: