12. Rickover experimented with another type of reactor design before rejecting its use
While Nautilus was still under construction, the keel was laid for the second nuclear submarine, Seawolf. Though the hull design was basically the same as Nautilus, the reactor selected for use in the submarine was an altogether different design. Built by General Electric, the reactor plant, designated the Submarine Intermediate Reactor (SIR), was technologically more complex than the pressurized water plant built by Westinghouse. It used liquid sodium as its coolant. In Seawolf the reactor plant proved problematic. Steam leaks and other failures haunted the design. By the time Seawolf was ready to become fully operational Rickover had decided the reactor was unsuitable for use in one of his submarines. Rickover cited the reactor’s cost as one factor in his decision as well as saying of the design they were “â¦susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair”.
The experiment with the liquid sodium reactor in Seawolf demonstrated Rickover’s preference for proven reliability over experimental technology. In 1958 Rickover ordered the faulty reactor replaced with pressurized water reactor of a design similar to Nautilus’. The replacement took all of 1959 and most of 1960. One officer who interviewed for assignment to Seawolf was a lieutenant qualified in submarines, Jimmy Carter. Assignment to the engineering department was to have been his, but Carter resigned his commission in 1953, after the death of his father. Though Carter had attended nuclear power school and was slated to work under Rickover, it was not to be. Many years later, Rickover served under Carter when the latter became President of the United States.
13. Rickover’s interviews of officers applying for the nuclear power program became legendary in the fleet
From its inception throughout his tenure as the head of the Navy’s nuclear power program, Hyman Rickover personally interviewed every officer attempting to enter it. Midshipmen applying from Annapolis and Naval ROTC schools, experienced submarine officers, and eventually senior aviators desirous of carrier commands, all faced the experience of a Rickover interview. Jimmy Carter recalled his interview lasted more than two hours, concluding with the question “Did you do your best?” in reference to his class standing at Annapolis. Carter, who graduated 59th in a class of 820 men, hesitated before admitting there had been times when he had not. Rickover’s response was a curt “Why not?” which was left unanswered. Carter, sure he had failed, was surprised when he was admitted to the program.
Rickover took steps to throw the interviewee off balance and uncomfortable. He positioned the chair before his desk so that sunlight would stream through a window directly into some of the interviewee’s eyes. The chair itself had the front legs shorter than the rear, causing the applicant to slide forward if he didn’t keep his legs firmly braced to hold him in place. Some applicants were forced to wait in a broom closet if their responses did not please him. He said later that he wanted to give them time to think. For others, the interview consisted of a single question. He was brash, cantankerous, and often cranky, and many of the officers accepted in the program later expressed surprise, having left his office certain of their failure. It was just one of several details over which Rickover maintained total control.
14. Rickover supported the British effort to obtain nuclear submarines after first resisting it
In 1955 USS Nautilus displayed features which immediately rendered most of the world’s navies’ antisubmarine warfare techniques obsolete. Nautilus was simply too fast, could dive too deeply, and most of all, could operate too quietly. Joint operations with the British and American navies made it apparent to the Royal Navy it needed nuclear submarines to remain relevant. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Mountbatten, requested an opportunity to inspect Nautilus in 1955. Rickover refused. He opposed the transfer of American technology, even to the British, notwithstanding the “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain. He also held the highborn Mountbatten, an uncle to Prince Philip and the second cousin of Queen Elizabeth in the disdain held by the son of poor Polish immigrants.
In 1956 Rickover toured Britain and concluded the British were many years from achieving nuclear-powered submarines for their fleet. He requested a private meeting with Mountbatten in which he offered his support for the British obtaining American nuclear technology. In a blunt assessment of the British program, Rickover asked Mountbatten, “Do you want a working reactor plant now, or would you rather preserve British pride?” HMS Dreadnought, the first British nuclear submarine was commissioned in 1963. It carried the entire propulsion system of the American Skipjack class submarines, including a fifth-generation nuclear reactor built by Westinghouse to Rickover’s standards. For subsequent British nuclear submarines a reactor plant developed by Vickers and Rolls-Royce, adopting much of the American design and technology, were selected for use.
15. Battling contractors became a major issue for Rickover in the early 1960s
By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, the US Navy had 26 nuclear submarines in commission, another 30 under construction, two nuclear-powered surface ships, the carrier Enterprise and the cruiser Long Beach, and a third surface ship readying for commissioning. Rickover’s branch included representatives at all the laboratories, shipyards, contractors, major subcontractors, and fleet commands. At least one representative at every location was required to complete a written report on observations, problems, and solutions to Admiral Rickover weekly. They were called Rickover’s “spies”. It was the Admiral’s practice to personally take part in certifying each ship’s engineering plant before it became operational, and with exceptions only for illness Rickover rode each boat on its initial sea trials. Needless to say, the Admiral was a busy man.
He refused to relax his standards screening men for acceptance into his nuclear program, despite pressures from seniors complaining of a shortage of qualified crewmen. He also resisted the pressures of builders and contractors to relax equipment standards, or provide waivers when the equipment was not perfect but was close enough. To Rickover, close enough meant substandard, which was wholly unacceptable. He also felt many of the standards applied to submarine construction were in fact not strict enough, particularly in areas of pipe joints, Many of these were brazed rather than welded. Rickover insisted that all joints in the reactor compartment, the only area of the submarine in which he held total control, were to be welded. He dealt with recalcitrant contractors by refusing to pay them, and by demanding outside inspections of welds and pipe fittings. This caused delays and adversely affected operational demands. Rickover refused to yield.
16. The loss of Thresher vindicated many of Rickover’s views
In April, 1963, during a controlled test dive, USS Thresher was lost with all hands and several civilian contractors aboard. Though the exact cause of the vessel’s sinking remains unknown, it was widely believed to have begun when a brazed pipe fitting failed, causing water to spray on electrical equipment, shorting it out, and beginning an accident chain which doomed the ship. The hull imploded after it passed crush depth. Subsequent surveys of the wreck site, in the 1960s and again in the 1980s, revealed no leakage of radiation from the submarine’s reactor plant. Rickover’s exacting standards, which applied only to the reactor and its immediate support equipment, maintained reactor safety even in the catastrophic loss of the ship. In 1968 the United States lost a second nuclear submarine, USS Scorpion. Surveys of its wreckage likewise revealed no radiation leakage, even after two decades.
The loss of Threshervindicated Rickover’s long-held views that the standards he applied to the reactor plant should be adopted throughout the submarine which is propelled. Contractors balked, as the more rigid standards ate into profits, caused cost overruns, and delayed delivery dates. Retrofitting existing submarines took longer, and operational commanders found they had not enough ships to meet commitments. Rickover continued to fight for more rigid standards, earning more enemies, but for the most part, getting his way. He stressed reactor safety, crew safety, and equipment safety, in that order, as paramount over all other considerations. He made equipment standards higher, rather than allowing them to ease, despite the insistence of ship builders and contractors the standards were unreasonably restrictive. Rickover’s strict adherence to standards and budgets earned him the support of Congress and made it difficult for his superiors to retire him.
17. Rickover personally directed all aspects of the Navy’s nuclear program
Rickover did not believe in delegating responsibility. In his mind, he was personally responsible, the ultimate authority, for all aspects of the nuclear Navy. His schedule reflected that belief. On any given day he could be inspecting a reactor under construction, or an operating prototype, or reviewing a budget, or visiting a contractor’s facilities, or testifying before Congress, or meeting with the President. He inspected ships and submarines, quizzed the crew from the Captain to the lowliest enlisted man in the engineering spaces. His conversations with crew and his interviews with applicants to the program led him to believe the American education system was failing in its task. He was particularly critical of Annapolis, which he believed focused too much on military rigidity and tradition, and not enough on teaching students to think for themselves.
As early as 1959 Rickover published a collection of essays which discussed the failures of the American education system, writing, “It is my considered opinion that there is no problem that faces the Congress or the country that is as important”. In 1962 the Admiral, evidently finding too much spare time on his hands, undertook a comparison study of American education to that of Switzerland. America’s system did not fare well in his estimation. He published his findings in a 1962 book, Swiss Schools and Ours: Why Theirs Are Better, in which he argued for higher standards, especially in mathematics and sciences, and a longer school year and day for American schools. To Rickover, lax education standards in the United States presented a national security problem. His arguments, presented over three decades, largely fell on deaf ears.
19. A cost overrun scandal with Electric Boat helped trigger Rickover’s downfall
In 1981, Rickover testified before a Congressional committee that the only two shipyards building submarines for the US Navy were defrauding the taxpayers. Rickover accused Electric Boat and Newport News Naval Shipyard of submitting fraudulently low bids to build submarines, after which they submitted claims for reimbursement for cost overruns. According to the Admiral, “Both yards have a battery of lawyers whose sole job is to file claims”. Rickover told Congress that though overruns occurred at both yards, Electric Boat, a division of General Dynamics, was considerably and measurably worse. He testified, “Apparently, Electric Boat’s bidding tactics were aimed at trying to force Newport News out of business”. Rickover asked Congress for legislation to reform the bidding and awards process. Electric Boat called foul and claimed the cost overruns occurred as a result of demands for greater testing and evaluation of their work, which inaccurately labeled some as substandard.
As the controversy flared and Rickover demanded the Navy not pay for fraudulent overruns, he continued his practice to ride each new submarine on its initial sea trials. He was aboard USS La Jolla for its trials in the summer of 1981. He oversaw a maneuver known as a “crashback”, a test of the ship’s braking ability when the engines are thrown into reverse. The ship temporarily lost control, and contractor personnel aboard for the test quickly blamed Rickover. There were no injuries and little damage. Following the incident came claims that over the years Rickover had accepted gifts from Electric Boat and other contractors, which in later interviews Rickover freely admitted. He gave many of them away to members of Congress. The combination of the near-accident, the gifts scandal, and his opposition to the Navy paying for fraudulent overruns finally gave the Navy the opportunity to retire him.
20. Rickover was forcibly retired in January, 1982
On January 31, 1982, Rickover was retired from the Navy, after 63 years of continual service, spanning the administrations of 13 Presidents, from Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan. According to Rickover, he learned of the fact from his wife, who heard a radio report on the subject. Rickover refused an offer to serve as a special adviser on nuclear matters in typically salty terms when Reagan told him of it in the Oval Office. Shortly after removing Rickover the Navy closed its investigation into Electric Boat and General Dynamics and paid most of the overrun claims, $634 million. In February 1983, a private retirement party was held in Rickover’s honor, with former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all in attendance. President Reagan did not attend. Nor did representatives from Electric Boat, with whom he had often clashed late in his career.
During his career, his Nuclear Power Program created a record of reliability and safety second to none. The US Navy, with well over 100 reactors built and operated under Rickover’s guidance, has never had an accident or incident which led to radiation leakage. The pressurized water reactor developed for his program, and in large part to his design, currently powers all US Navy nuclear submarines and surface ships. US Navy ships and submarines have steamed almost 200 million miles, underway on nuclear power. Admiral Rickover died in 1986, and after funeral services held at the National Cathedral in Washington was buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Two years before his death he attended the commissioning of the USS Hyman G. Rickover, a Los Angeles class attack submarine. One of Rickover’s maxims, regarding good ideas, is displayed at the US Navy Museum. “They must be driven into practice with courageous impatience”.
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