Seven American Generals Who Shaped How We Wage War
Seven American Generals Who Shaped How We Wage War

Seven American Generals Who Shaped How We Wage War

Michelle Powell-Smith - November 27, 2016

Seven American Generals Who Shaped How We Wage War
FILE – In this Sept. 14, 1990 file photo, U.S. Army Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, answers questions during an interview in Riyadh. Schwarzkopf died Thursday, Dec. 27, 2012 in Tampa, Fla. He was 78. (AP Photo/David Longstreath, File)

Norman B. Schwarzkopf

General Norman B. Shwarzkopf finished his military education in 1956, and served two tours with great honor in Vietnam; however, he personally questioned the strategies employed in the war. He believed that the conflict in Vietnam lacked a clear objective or well-designed strategy. Following Vietnam, Schwarzkopf continued to climb in the military administration, gaining rank and skill.

He was, in his capacity as the head of the U.S. Central Command, responsible for organizing both Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. This was the largest mechanized deployment of U.S. forces and equipment since World War II.

Between August 1990 and January 1991, Schwarzkopf assembled some 765,000 troops-541,000 American-from a total of 28 countries, hundreds of ships, and thousands of tanks and aircraft. The first step in the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a six-week long aerial bombardment. Schwarzkopf hoped that this would rapidly lead to a peace settlement; however, it did not.

Schwarzkopf’s strategy was a relatively classic one. When the aerial assault failed, Schwarzkopf feigned an amphibious assault, beginning the ground war on February 24. In reality, his troops were quickly wrapping around Iraq’s elite Republican Guard to cut off supply lines and communication. Allied losses were very few, with fewer than 300 dead. Within only 100 hours, the United Nations’ coalition troops had regained control of all of Kuwait. While Schwarzkopf believed that the forces should move on to Baghdad, the United Nations had only approved the reclamation of Kuwait, rather than an assault on Iraq’s capitol.

His strategies were classic, but they were effective; he accomplished the goals set forth by the United Nations at a minimal human cost to allied troops, and with great speed. Schwarzkopf retired in 1992. He continued to question the decision not to press on to Baghdad during Desert Storm.

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